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CURRENT DECISIONS

recognize the need for insanity as a ground for divorce, the situation of
the sane spouse, as in Crittenden, undoubtedly will recur.
NICHOLAS JoHN DERomA

Uniform Commercial Code-CASH PAYMENT BY THE PAYOR BANx,
Kirby v. First & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 210 Va. 88, 168 S.E.2d 27
(1969).
On December 30, 1966 appellant Kirby presented to the appellee
payor bank a check in the amount of $2,500 drawn by Neuse Engineering and Dredging Co. payable to and endorsed by appellant. 1 Appellant maintained an account with the appellee and his deposit ticket
accompanied the check calling for a deposit in currency of $2,300. That
portion of the ticket which provided for the listing of checks deposited
was blank. The teller, as requested, handed the appellant $200 in cash
and on the appellee's next business day the appellant's account was
credited with a deposit of $2,300. An employee of the appellee noted
on the back of the check, "cash for dep." 2
On January 4, 1967, the appellee discovered that the drawer's account
contained insufficient funds to cover the check, and an officer of appellee
phoned the appellant to advise that the appellee had dishonored the
check. Appellant promised to cover the check but did not, and appellee
charged appellant's account with $2,500, creating a $543.47 overdraft.
The appellee then instituted an action to recover. Appealing from a
judgment for the appellee bank, the appellant questioned the bank's right
to charge back the check.3
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the appellee had
no right to charge the appellant's account with the dishonored check.
Finding that the $2,500 had been paid in cash, the court concluded that
the bank had made final payment and could not sue the appellant on the
4
check, notwithstanding defendant's indorsement and presentment.
Traditionally, payment in cash of an item by the payor bank has
constituted final payment and the Uniform Commercial Code has
1.
2.
3.
4.

Kirby v. First & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 210 Va. 88, 168 S..2d 273 (1969).
Id. at 88, 168 S.E.2d at 279.
Id. at 91, 168 SE.2d at 275.
Id. at 92, 168 S.E.2d at 276.
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adopted this rule.5 With few exceptions6 the transaction has then been
regarded as closed as between the parties to the payment. 7 Upon discovery of his error, the payor cannot collect the sum so paid to the
payee.8 Although the Negotiable Instruments Law was vague in this
regard,9 the U.C.C. has clearly adopted the majority view.10
The courts have generally held that when negotiable paper is dishonored, the depository bank may charge the depositor on his unrestricted indorsement, and the U.C.C. concurs;" however, this right of
recovery is not applicable when the depository bank is also the payor
bank and pays the item in cash. The drawee is under a positive duty
in respect to the account of the drawer 12 and an indorsement to the
§ 4-213 provides:
(1) An item is finally paid by a payor bank when the bank has done any
of the following, whichever happens first:
(a) paid the item in cash....
See Id., Comment 3, which sets forth the traditional view and 9 3-418.
6. E.g., Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Diamond, 17 Misc. 2d 909, 186 N.Y.S. 2d 917
(Sup. Ct. 1959) held that the drawee may recover provided the payee is not damaged;
Turetsky v. Morris Plan Indus. Bank, 22 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
7. The REsTATEMENT or RxrrTrIoN S 33 (1937) concludes:
The holder of a check or other bill of exchange who, having paid value
in good faith therefor, receives payment from the drawee without reason
to know that the drawee is mistaken, is under no duty of restitution to
him although the drawee pays because of a mistaken belief that he has
sufficient funds of the drawer or that he is otherwise under a duty to pay.
This is clearly the prevailing view. See e.g., Orlich v. Rubio Say. Bank, 240 Iowa 1074,
38 N.W.2d 622 (1949); National Bank v. Marshburn, 229 N.C. 104, 47 SZE.2d 793
(1948); National Bank v. Berrall, 70 N.JIL. 757, 58 A. 189 (1904); Fidelity & Cas. Co.
v. Planenscheck, 200 Wis. 304, 227 N.W. 387 (1929); 33 MINN. L. REv. 305 (1949).
8. "According to the weight of authority the drawee who honors an overdraft
is denied the right to recover the money so paid from the bona fide purchaser thereof."
W. BrrroN, Biis AND Noas § 137 at 388 (2d ed. 1961).
Virginia has long followed this rule. E.g., Citizens Bank v. Schwarzschild & Sultzberger Co., 109 Va. 539, 64 S.E. 954 (1909). See also National Bank v. Berrall, 70 N.J.L.
757, 58 A. 189 (1904); Manufacturers Nat'l Bank v. Swift, 70 Md. 515, 17 A. 336
(1889); Spokane & E. Trust Co. v. Huff, 63 Wash. 225, 115 P. 80 (1911).
9. C. BunN, H. SNEA4D, & R. SPEIDEL, AN INTRoDouCroN To THE U.C.C., at 3.29 (A)
(1964).
10. See UNIFORM CoMMEcIAL CODE § 3-418, 4-213; Id. §§ 3-417, 4-207 Comments.
11. UNIFORMdt COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-414(1), 4-201. The courts generally regard this
right to charge back as no more than a means of enforcing the depositor's liability as
an indorser of dishonored paper. E.g., Scott v. W. H. McIntyre Co., 93 Kan. 508, 144
P. 1002 (1914); Caledonia Nat'l Bank v. McPherson, 116 Va. 328, 75 A.2d 685 (1950);
Vickers v. Machinery Warehouse & Sales Co., 111 Wash. 576, 191 P. 869 (1920);
Blatz Brewing Co. v. Richardson & Richardson, Inc., 245 Wis. 567, 15 N.W.2d 819 (1944).
12. In Manufacturers Nat'l Bank v. Swift, 70 Md. 515, 17 A. 336 (1889), the court
5.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
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payor is not part of the negotiation but acts merely as a receipt."
Should the check be deposited in the payor bank, the bank might be
able to protect itself from liability of this character by an agreement
with its depositor authorizing the bank to charge back any item found
to be improper.14 Such provisions, however, have been held immaterial
when it was understood that the deposit was accepted and treated as
cash.'5 A contrary rule would eliminate the certainty of a commercial
transaction involving payment by check.'"
In Kirby v. First & Merchants National Bank, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia found that the appellee had paid the item in cash
constituting final payment by the payor bank under the U.C.C.Y The
bank could not recover from defendant on the indorser's contract because the indorser contracts to pay only if the instrument is dishonored,'8 and an indorsement runs only to a holder. The drawee-appellee,
did not dishonor the check but paid it in cash. The court recognized
the application of the warranties made to the drawee bank by a
presentor and by prior transferors of a check,'2 but held that the appellant had not breached any warranties. 20
The court examined the depositor's contract, upon which appellee
based his contention that a provisional settlement existed whether or not
the check was paid in cash, but found the contract inapplicable by its
own terms once final payment had been made." Further, it concluded
stated that the duty upon the drawee bank is to "know the state of its depositor's
account, and if it makes a mistake in this respect it must abide the consequences."
13. C. Burm, H. SNEAD, and R. SPEIDEL, supra note 9, at 5 3.4(B).
14. 3 T. PATON, PAToN's Dionsr OF LEGAL OpnmoNs, Overdrafts § 5 (1944). But see
UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-103.
15. "The provision in the passbook and deposit slip as to items deposited for collection has no bearing here, since the plaintiff's check was not accepted and treated as
an item for collection, but as 'cash'." Kraus v. Chatham Phenix Nat'1 Bank & Trust
Co., 143 Misc. 508, 256 N.Y.S. 721, 725 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1932).
16. 3 T. PATON, supra note 14, at § 4.
17. 210 Va. at 92, 168 S2E.2d at 276; UNIFoRM COMMERCLAL CODE §4-213(1) (a).
18. UNFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-414(1) stipulates that:
Unless the indorsement otherwise specifies (as by such words as "Without
recourse") every indorser engages that upon dishonor and any necessary
notice of dishonor and protest he will pay the instrument according to
its tenor at the time of his indorsement to the holder or to any subsequent
indorser who takes it up, even though the indorser who takes it up
was not obligated to do so.
19. Id. §§ 3-417(1), 4-207(1).
20. 210 Va. at 92, 168 S.E.2d at 276.
21. The pertinent provision of the depositor's contract stipulates:
This bank acts only as depositor's collecting agent and assumes no
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that even if the contract could have made the settlement provisional, the
bank had not complied with the Code's requirement of prompt return of
the item and had lost its right to charge the item back to defendant's
account.22
The conclusions of the court, operating entirely under the provisions
of the U.C.C., are patterned closely after the law developed prior to the
Code's adoption. The cash payment of negotiable paper by the drawee is
final as between the parties to the payment, and if the drawer's funds
prove insufficient the drawee cannot then collect from the payee. It is
the responsibility of the drawee to know the state of the drawer's
account and he finalizes payment at his own risk.
RICHARD STAFFORD BRAY

Torts-MENTAL DIsTRss-RcoV ERY BY TIRD PERSON S. Archibald
v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 290,-P.2d-, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).

Plaintiff's son was seriously injured by an explosive allegedly due to
defendant's negligence in selling the son explosive materials. Plaintiff
brought an action to recover damages for emotional trauma and mental
illness, which required institutionalization as a result of viewing her son's
injuries within moments after the explosion. Summary judgment was
granted for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed.'
The District Court of Appeals of California reversed, holding that
even though the mother did not actually witness the explosion, she
2
would be entitled to recover if negligence of the defendant were proved.
The court in Archibald, following the rationale of Dillon v. Legg,'
responsibility beyond its exercise of due care. All items are credited subject to final payment and to receipt of proceeds of final payment in
cash or solvent credits by this bank at its own office.
Id. at 93 n.6, 168 S.E.2d at 277 n.6.
22. UmFoRm COMMERCIAL CODE §5 4-212(3), 4-301 provide that in order to revoke

a settlement, the payor bank before its midnight deadline must return the item or
send written notice of dishonor or nonpayment if return is unavailable.
1. The Superior Court of Riverside County hearing this case in February, 1968, based
its decision on Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513,

29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), where a mother was denied recovery for injuries sustained as
a result of emotional shock and mental disturbance received upon witnessing the
defendant's truck run over her infant child.
2. 275 Cal. App. 2d at 290,
P.2d
, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
3. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).

Dillon, decided prior to

the appeal in Archibald, overruled Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., and
became new precedent.

In determining whether the defendant should reasonably

